The main objective of this paper is to provide an overview of the amount and the
Roads HC and HAC are required to apply capital approach (because they have a public good in their balance sheet), according to which they present their operating result as neither profit nor loss. 2 The resulting difference between own income and expenditure incurred in the current fiscal year, is made up at the expense of public capital.
Rijeka-Zagreb Motorway
Inc. was founded in 1997 and is fully owned by the state. The economic purpose of the company is the financing, construction, management and maintenance of the RijekaZagreb motorway and its road and ancillary facilities on the land of the road in the exercise of rights granted by the Concession Agreement. The concession was given to the Company for a period of 32 years and 11 months.
Restructuring and debt monetization of HAC and ARZ. In 2013 the partial restructuring of HAC and ARZ was performed based on the Restructuring program for the period 2012-2015 which was produced by HAC and the Ministry of the Sea, Transport and Infrastructure (HAC, 2012) . The aim is to harmonize operations of the companies with European standards (changes in organizational structure, effective financial management, downsizing, introduction of a corporate business strategy) and preparation for the monetization of their part of the public debt through awarding concessions for the operation and maintenance of highways. In April 2013, Croatian Motorways Maintenance and Toll Payment (HAC-ONC) Ltd. began to work as a subsidiary of HAC and merged with the newly-established company Rijeka-Zagreb Motorway Maintenance and Toll (ARZ-ON) Ltd. as a subsidiary of ARZ. At the same time ARZ and HAC remained owned by the state. The merger of ARZ-ON with HAC-ONC was registered in the Commercial Court in Zagreb on January 31, 2014.
GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO ROAD TRANSPORT COMPANIES
There are guarantees approved by the Government and those approved by the Parliament. The Government decides on the making of all government guarantees, other than state guarantees -which are approved by the Parliament at the recommendation of the Ministry of Finance. The Parliament adopts special decisions related to government guarantees issued in favour of international financial institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and European Investment Bank (EIB) as well as for HC and HAC. These guarantees are not included in the annual limit on the issuance of state guarantees prescribed by the law on the execution of the state budget for a particular year.
From 2001 until 2013, 80 guarantees amounting to HRK 56.7bn were granted to companies from the road transport sector. The largest number of guarantees issued in a particular year was 9 (totalling HRK 5.2bn) in 2009, whereas the largest amount (HRK 8bn) of guarantees was approved in 2011. From 2001 until 2013, the share of guarantees for the three companies in total guarantees granted to the transport sector was greater than 55%. In 2004 and 2008, almost all the guarantees granted to the transport sector were related to road transport. In the last three years more than 60% of total guarantees were granted to companies from the road transport sector.
On average, government guarantees in the amount of around 1.2% of GDP are made yearly to the transport sector, most of it to companies from the road transport sector. Some of those guarantees have expired, i.e. companies have paid off part of their loan obligations.
The largest amount of guarantees was approved for HAC -as much as HRK 35.3bn, followed by HC with HRK 11.4bn and ARZ with HRK 10.1bn (Tab. 2). The Republic of Croatia almost fully guarantees the liabilities of all three companies. Therefore, the analysis of state guarantees can reveal the picture of borrowing conditions, potential risks, maturity of credits and loans that are granted to publicly owned companies by both domestic and foreign commercial banks and international financial institutions (EIB, EBRD and IBRD).
FINANCIAL LIABILITIES AND GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES FOR ROADS
From the data contained in financial statements it can be seen that the financial liabilities (mainly loans) of publicly owned road transport companies rose from HRK 32.5bn in 2009 to HRK 38.9bn in 2013 (from 9.8 to 11.8% of GDP). The largest increase was recorded in the financial liabilities of HC, of about HRK 4bn, and in those of HAC, of HRK 2.6bn. The financial liabilities of ARZ are gradually declining. Total loan obligations of HC at the end of 2013 were HRK 8.8bn. Long-term liabilities were about HRK 8bn, whereby the state has guaranteed for liabilities in the amount of HRK 7bn (loans and credits from EIB, IBRD and EBRD). The most critical period for HC are the next four years when almost half of its loan obligations -HRK 4.5bn becomes due (see Tab. 3.1. in Appendix).
In the next five years almost HRK 18bn of loan obligations become due for HAC, nearly HRK 5bn during 2014 alone (see Tab. 3.2. in Appendix).
Out of HRK 8.8bn in 2013, ARZ paid off only HRK 1.5bn of loans, and the company still faces debts in the amount of HRK 7.3bn. The company is illiquid; its long-term liabilities are 56% higher than total assets. The item "equity" is negative because ARZ managed to achieve a loss above the equity value. During 2014, loans in the amount of around HRK 1bn become due for ARZ, and in the next 5 years another HRK 2bn will fall due (see Tab. 3.3. in Appendix).
It should be noted that the largest portion of the road transport companies' liabilities is long-term, with variations that are generally associated with new borrowings with shorter maturities. More than 80% are long-term liabilities. HAC has a relatively unfavourable maturity structure of liabilities with shortterm liabilities accounting for more than 20%. Total cumulative short-term liabilities of all companies together increased from HRK 3.7bn in 2009 to HRK 7.76bn in 2013. An increase in the share of short-term liabilities creates additional pressure on the liquidity and solvency. This is primarily the result of a poor financial operation (high liabilities and unfavourable cost structure), which is why lenders are not inclined to grant long-term loans.
THE STRUCTURE OF LIABILITIES AND GUARANTEES
The analysis of government guarantees indirectly provides an insight into the structure of the financial liabilities of publicly-owned road transport companies. This information is mostly scattered throughout the financial statements, annual reports of the Ministry of Finance, the Official Gazette (part of international agreements) etc. Unfortunately, no systematized overview presented in one place exists.
Terms of borrowing. From 2012 until 2014 road transport companies borrowed mainly for programs of construction, maintenance of roads and highways, and for meeting credit obligations. These loans had maturities of seven years, with variable interest rates. The fixed part of the interest rate varied from 4 to 5.6%, whereas the variable portion was usually a six-month or a three-month (6M or 3M) Euribor. In order to get a clear image of borrowing costs, the interest costs should be observed together with high bank charges that are generally incurred once -as a percentage of the loan amount. From 2012 until 2014 one-time charges (fees) for 15 loans approved amounted to about EUR 18.9m or HRK 144.6m. There are also additional costs of banks' agency fees that range from EUR 2,000 to 20,000 per year (totalling about EUR 441,000 or HRK 3.36m). Due to additional bank fees the effective interest rate fluctuates within the range of 6-7%.
Currency composition. Out of HRK 57bn of approved guarantees, as much as HRK 53bn is denominated in EUR (over 90%). ARZ have all guarantees (and credit obligations) denominated in EUR. Credits in HRK are much less represented -only 6.33% for HC and 1.16% for HAC. Credit liabilities denominated in USD accounted for 7.9% and are present only in HAC. This means that financial liabilities of observed companies are exposed to currency risk, and any depreciation of HRK would significantly worsen the debt service conditions (see Figure 1. ).
Creditors. From 2001 until 2006, the main creditors were the international financial institutions, and rarely domestic commercial banks. From 2006 until 2014 borrowing from domestic and foreign commercial banks was more common, whereas borrowing from international financial institutions was almost non-existent, except for 2010 and 2011 (see Figure 2 ). For all three observed companies, creditors are domestic and foreign commercial banks and international financial institutions. Domestic commercial banks are exposed in the amount of about HRK 20bn and foreign about 19bn (of which 13bn refers to HAC). Interestingly, foreign commercial banks have not lent to HC. International financial institutions have evenly granted loans and credits to all three companies (a total of HRK 2bn). It is questionable why the state does not to a greater extent borrow from international financial institutions for its infrastructure projects instead of (un)consciously borrowing from foreign and domestic commercial banks (even from the Post Bank) under unfavourable conditions. With the relatively high interest rates it incurs, the state is for those creditors an extremely desirable client.
Maturity of liabilities.
According to the analysis of guarantees by maturity it can be concluded that most of the guarantees for credits and loans (29%) of road transport companies are approved for a period of 5-10 years (the amount of HRK 16.4bn). The smallest share was approved short-term -up to 5 years (8% or HRK 4.6bn) and long-term -over 20 years (11% or 6.3bn). From 2001 until 2013, 80 guarantees with average maturity of 12 years were issued to road transport companies. From 2001 until 2007 the average maturity was about 16 years, but in the last two years the average maturity was reduced to about seven years (see Tab. 5 and 6 in the Appendix). High borrowing requirements of road transport companies with high financial risks due to the growth of public debt contributed to the increase in interest rates and reduction of maturities even for borrowings supported with government guarantees. Obviously, the credibility of the state and publicly owned road transport companies has been significantly diminished, so government guarantees have almost no impact on the borrowing conditions (maturities and interest rates). The growth of short-term liabilities of road transport companies is a sign of the increased financial risks related to debt service that will especially be present in the next four years.
Potential maturity. Road transport companies have created liabilities for the payment of principal and interest (guaranteed by the state) until 2034. Most liabilities mature in 2017, 2018 and 2019 when a total of HRK 17.2bn becomes due in just three years (see Figure 3 ).
LIABILITIES OF ROAD TRANSPORT COMPANIES, MONETIZATION AND FINANCIAL RISKS
The liabilities of road transport companies are large. HAC and ARZ are not able to finance those liabilities without support from the government budget. Financial risks of road transport companies are high due to high indebtedness. Road transport companies (especially ARZ) are additionally exposed to interest rate, credit and liquidity risk. Most of the loans are denominated in EUR, which creates negative foreign exchange differences. 3 Interest rates are variable, exposing road transport companies to additional risks (of changes in interest rates).
In 2012, the Government decided to look for an extra-budgetary financing model in order to reduce the burden of liabilities due by 2018. In 2012, the Government engaged several companies (Erste Group Bank AG, Deloitte Consulting Services Ltd., Wolf Theiss Rechtsanwälte GmbH -Zagreb subsidiary and the company for management of motorways Asfinag International) as consultants for a possible model of monetization of highways (concessions, bonds secured by toll revenue, management contract, the privatization of motorways and privatization of the motorways' operator). The consultants narrowed the selection down to two possible models of monetization -the award of concessions for the management and maintenance of the highways and the issuance of project bonds (which would be repayable with revenue from tolls). Analyses carried out by consultants have shown that the concession model would be the most appropriate. According to this model, motorways would be given in concession for a period of 30-40 years with concession fees ranging from EUR 2.4 to 2.9bn. If the concession period is extended to 50 years then the estimated amount of concession fees could rise to EUR 3.4bn. Such a concession would be the largest foreign investment in the history of the Republic of Croatia. The project followed the Government's Program of restructuring of HAC for the period 2012-2015 which envisaged, even before monetization, restructuring of the company aimed at reducing the cost of management and maintenance of motorways as well as the stock of financial liabilities. In line with this model, a special purpose company (HAC-ONC) was established. After the expiry of a period for which a concession to a public good is made (as economic value), the value of the public good returns to the state.
The Government should have carried out the restructuring of companies by 2014 and by October 2014 completed the whole process of selection, conclusion of the contract and received the concession fee from the investor (concessionaire). But it is certain that the process will not be completed in 2014.
All deficiencies and risks that existed, and were not solved in the restructuring process, could affect the potential amount of the concession fees.
The potential risk lies in the fact that highways were being considered for a concession without a comprehensive insight into the conditions of their previous borrowings, the elaboration of interest and principal repayment for financial liabilities up to 2034 as well as the financial and other business risks. Besides these problems, a number of additional risks related primarily to the valuation of road transport companies' assets, financial risks due to legal proceedings and uncertain additional requirements of trade unions still remain.
HAC faces HRK 613 m in claims in the courts (as of 2013) due to legal disputes. Such claims may have an impact on the operations of companies if there is no estimate of the expected outcome of legal proceedings as well as their expected duration. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the justification of the amount of reservations for potential outflow of funds in this regard.
ARZ is significantly exposed to financial risks. For HC (which is not at the focus of monetization) serious problems of property valuation still remain. HC has not carried out the valuation of roads and buildings since 2000. Due to this reason, the company received a qualified independent auditor's opinion in 2012 and 2013. The problem lies in the fact that HC does not have completely clear property rightsownership of real estate (an ongoing process), nor does it have developed methodology for valuation of public roads (in the process of the development of the methodology) and the valuation assessment. In addition, a significant number of legal proceedings are being conducted against the company (about HRK 328 m in 2013).
Even the potential risks (weaknesses in the valuation of assets, litigation, etc.) are not an obstacle to investors interested in investing in motorways. However, these deficiencies can affect the final amount of the concession fee. For the Government, it is essential minutely to specify the conditions for approving the concession, and in particular to solve all dilemmas and risks that may affect the amount of concession fees. This requires a significant professional engagement.
Since monetization may affect the amount of debt and the budget deficit, it will be necessary to get the confirmation of the European Commission for its implementation, because Croatia is in the excessive deficit procedure.
CONCLUSION
In the last two years state companies from the road transport sector have borrowed under relatively unfavourable conditions from both domestic and foreign commercial banks and with maturities of less than seven years. The total amount of road transport companies' debt is -since 2014 -recorded as a general government debt, which additionally stresses the importance of preparation and adoption of the Public Debt Management Strategy. Within the Strategy the Government should in particular take account of risks associated with financial liabilities of road transport companies and find the most appropriate instruments to refinance those liabilities.
Due to the extremely weak financial position of HAC and ARZ caused by heavy borrowing in previous years, it is almost certain that these companies can not repay the interest and principal without new borrowing. In order to reduce the credit risk, the Government has to continue with the restructuring of road transport companies. Monetization (giving in concession) might be beneficial in this process.
The Government still has to implement a thorough approach in solving the problem of road transport companies. This has to be done since the high liabilities of those companies create a constant pressure on the Government to make further borrowings and increase the general government debt. In the case of the monetization of motorways the Government will get some extra time (3-5 years) to stabilize the public debt and perform significant cuts in the process of restructuring of public companies -to reduce expenditures for employees, subsidies and borrowing. Once the monetization was in place, the Government would still have an obligation to pay the principal and interest of the road transport companies' debt. However, through monetization of motorways (giving concessions to them) the Government would receive a one-time revenue from the concession fee which could cover part of liabilities falling due in the next 3-5 years. If the Government decides not to monetize the motorways, it has to ensure that publicly owned road transport companies are managed in the same way as they would be managed by the private concessionaire. 
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